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Abstract 
This paper provides a time-series analysis of recent annual estimates of real GDP and industrial output 
covering 1270 to 1913.  We show that growth can be regarded as a segmented trend stationary process.  
On this basis, we find that trend growth of real GDP per person was zero prior to the 1660s but then 
experienced two significant accelerations, pre- and post-industrial revolution.  We also find that the 
hallmark of the industrial revolution is a substantial increase in the trend rate of growth of industrial 
output rather than being an episode of difference stationary growth. 
JEL Classification: N13; O47 
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1 Introduction 
The recent publication of the results of an ambitious project to provide estimates of long-run 
English economic growth (Broadberry et al., 2015) marks a major step forward in the 
analysis of pre-industrial economic performance.  The book provides annual estimates of real 
GDP, population, and of real output in the agricultural, industrial and services sectors from 
1270 to 1870 for England pre-1700 and Britain post-1700.  On the basis of these numbers, the 
authors put forward a new analysis of British economic growth. 
Our principal objective in this paper is to examine the validity of the description and analysis 
of economic growth provided by Broadberry et al. (2015), in particular by evaluating the 
statistical properties of the time series on which they are based.  The discussion provided by 
the authors is informal and based on arithmetic rather than econometrics.  We believe that 
time-series analysis can be helpful in several ways.  Most obviously, it is valuable to consider 
explicitly the confidence intervals around estimated trends and to test formally for structural 
breaks.  In addition, it is important to consider the nature of trend growth in a pre-industrial 
economy and whether it differs from that experienced under modern economic growth: for 
example, was a trend-stationary phase superseded by a difference-stationary era?
1
  Time-
series analysis of the new estimates also provides an opportunity to revisit the work of Mills 
and Crafts (1996a) on trends in industrial output growth during the industrial revolution to 
see how far it is now in need of revision.  
For our purposes in this paper, we take the growth estimates provided by Broadberry et al. 
(2015) as reliable and we do not attempt any critique of or revisions to them.  Of course, they 
may well be challenged or revised in future and already we know that the results of this 
project, based on building up estimates from the output side, contrast with those obtained by 
Clark (2010), which were derived from the income side.  For example, Clark’s estimates 
show incomes at the time of the Industrial Revolution to be no higher than 400 years earlier 
and thus seem consistent with a ‘Malthusian economy’.  Nevertheless, we think it useful to 
explore the implications of the Broadberry et al. estimates as they stand. 
Our main findings are as follows.  First, when Hodrick-Prescott (1997) trends are fitted to 
real GDP per person, we find that, on average, trend growth was 0.2% per year over the 500 
years from 1270 to 1770.  Nevertheless, growth performance before the Industrial Revolution 
differed between sub-periods, with trend growth approximately zero on average between 
                                                          
1
 A trend-stationary process is one for which all shocks to the series being analysed have only transitory effects 
and, in its simplest form, may be modelled as a linear time trend having random fluctuations about this trend, so 
that the series always reverts back to the trend line.  For a difference-stationary process, in contrast, all shocks 
are permanent, so that in its simplest form the series evolves as a (possibly drifting) random walk, and thus 
becomes the accumulation of all past shocks, which must then remain permanently in the series.  For more 
detailed discussion of the distinction from an economic history perspective see, for example, Mills (1996). 
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1400 and the mid-17
th
 century, after which trend growth accelerated during the 18
th
 century to 
about 0.3 per cent per year.  Following the industrial revolution, trend growth in real GDP per 
person peaked at about 1.25 per cent per year in the mid-19
th
 century. 
Second, further results from fitting Hodrick-Prescott trends to real GDP and to industrial 
production highlight the impact of the industrial revolution and the difference between trend 
growth in the 19
th
 century and all earlier periods.  Here, in an era of rapid population growth, 
the increases in trend growth are much larger than for the per capita series, reaching peaks of 
well over 2 per cent per year and 3 per cent per year, respectively, compared with well below 
1 per cent per year from the 16
th
 through the 18
th
 centuries.   
Third, we believe that a segmented trend model is preferable to the estimates obtained using 
the Hodrick-Prescott methodology; naturally these have much smaller standard errors 
attached to the estimated trend growth rates.  Fitting such a model using breakpoints 
indicated by the narrative account in Broadberry et al. (2015) yields estimates of trend growth 
of real GDP per person of 0.03 (0.00-0.06) per cent per year prior to 1663, 0.84 (0.68-1.00) 
per cent per year from 1663 to 1707, 0.27 (0.21-0.33) per cent per year from 1707 to 1822 
and 1.03 (0.97-1.09) per cent per year thereafter.
2
  This shows a statistically significant 
increase in growth during the early-modern period and distinctly before the industrial 
revolution and then a further, much larger, statistically significant increase as the impact of 
the industrial revolution was consolidated. 
Fourth, we are able to clarify the idea that there was an absence of ‘growth reversals’.  An 
analysis of the impact of the Black Death, which reduced population by nearly 50 per cent, 
shows that it can be seen as a levels shock which left the trend rate of growth unchanged.  
The trend rate of growth of real GDP per person is estimated as 0.03 per cent per year both 
pre-1350 and post-1400, but in the latter period output per person was sustained at a level 
about 40 per cent greater, quite unlike the predictions of a naive Malthusian model.  We also 
reject the hypothesis of a unit root in favour of trend-stationarity in each of the segments of 
the trend that we identify, implying that following a shock the economy would fairly quickly 
revert to its trend path.  From the second half of the 17
th
 century trend growth of real GDP 
per person was significantly above zero, which suggests that the Malthusian era was over. 
Fifth, trend growth in both GDP and industrial production follow an inverted U-shape if 
Hodrick-Prescott trends are estimated.  We find that here the preferred model in each case is 
a cubic segmented trend.  This reaches a maximum in 1857 of 2.27 (1.93-2.61) per cent per 
year for GDP and a maximum in 1842 of 2.99 (2.43-3.55) per cent per year for industrial 
production. 
                                                          
2
 Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Sixth, it might be supposed that the properties of the time series changed as the economy 
moved from the Smithian growth characteristic of pre-industrial times to modern economic 
growth, in particular that trend stationarity was superseded by difference stationarity.  In fact, 
this is generally not the case for the linear segmented trend models with the exception of 
failing to reject the unit-root null for industrial production in the interval 1782-1851, which 
includes the classic industrial revolution years.  Closer examination reveals, however, that for 
the preferred cubic segmented trend model the unit root hypothesis is rejected in favour of 
cubic trend stationarity. 
Overall, we think that these results are generally supportive of the interpretation of growth 
performance proposed by Broadberry et al. (2015). 
2 Literature Review 
The key features of the Broadberry et al. view can be summarized as follows.  First, on 
average over the 500 or so years before the Industrial Revolution, the economy experienced a 
small positive rate of growth of real GDP per person (about 0.2 per cent per year) rather than 
stagnation or decline (p. 213).  Second, there were two main components of this growth, 
namely, a big increase in the level of real GDP per person associated with the Black Death 
and then, for the first time, a move to a positive trend rate of growth of real GDP per person 
in the second half of the 17
th
 century (pp. 210-211).  Third, Britain did not experience major 
‘growth reversals’; on the contrary, stability and growth prevailed over decline of real GDP 
per person and this meant that gains in income levels were sustained over the long run, unlike 
in a Malthusian economy (p. 203).  Fourth, the Industrial Revolution saw a transition from 
Smithian growth to ‘modern economic growth’ (Kuznets, 1966), characterized by a further 
acceleration in the trend rate of growth of real GDP per person combined with significant 
population growth and underpinned by technological progress (pp. 212, 408-409).
3
 
By contrast, Clark (2010) explicitly rejects the idea that there was a long period of Smithian 
growth between 1300 and 1800, although he does see a period of slow growth of per capita 
GDP beginning around 1600 which makes the discontinuity of the industrial revolution less 
sharp.  On the other hand, the suggestion that the growth of real GDP per person shifted to a 
modest positive trend in the latter part of the pre-industrial revolution period matches the 
hypothesis, advanced by Galor (2011) in his exposition of unified growth theory, that in the 
later phases of the Malthusian Epoch a positive but very small growth rate of output per 
capita is to be expected.  The only attempt thus far to explore econometrically whether there 
                                                          
3
 The acceleration in growth during the Industrial Revolution is quite similar to that estimated by Crafts and 
Harley (1992) rather than the earlier, more dramatic, change proposed by Deane and Cole (1962). 
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are trend breaks in the Broadberry estimates suggests positive shifts in 1582 and 1853 
(Greasley et al., 2013).
4
 
Voigtländer and Voth (2013) propose that a high level of income in the Malthusian 
equilibrium is the platform from which subsequent take-off was launched.  If the Black Death 
resulted in a positive levels-effect shock to real GDP per person which was sustained for a 
lengthy period of time, this would account for a high-level equilibrium.  The consolidation of 
a higher income level after the Black Death saw a long period when population failed to 
recover – it took until the early 17th century to return to the level of the 1340s and a high level 
of mortality has been suggested as a key factor (Smith, 2012). 
Pomeranz (2000) triggered off a major debate on the timing of the so-called ‘Great 
Divergence’ between China and Europe by claiming that European overtaking in terms of 
real per capita income levels was much later than generally supposed and only completed 
during the industrial revolution.  This view has subsequently been rejected by quantitative 
economic historians.  Broadberry et al. (2015) contribute to this rejection and suggest that 
their new estimates imply that between the mid 16
th
 and the mid-19
th
 centuries Britain went 
from being a European laggard to a global leader (p.372) while economic decline in China 
meant it fell behind England by 1570 (p.375).  British success was underpinned by the 
absence of growth reversals augmented by Smithian growth from the late 18
th
 century. 
Greasley and Oxley (1994, p. 762) argued that to identify the industrial revolution as a 
distinct macroeconomic epoch requires that output innovations were permanent (difference 
stationary) during the discontinuity but transient (trend stationary) at other times.  They 
claimed that this criterion was met for industrial output for the years 1780-1851 during the 
period 1700 to 1913.  Crafts and Mills (1994) rejected this argument for two reasons.  First, 
they thought that the key criterion for the industrial revolution is in terms of a substantial rise 
in the trend rate of growth of output rather than the statistical properties of the time series and, 
second, they suggested that the appropriate alternative hypothesis was not linear but quadratic 
trend stationarity and rejected the unit root on this basis.  In the absence then of a suitable 
time series neither of these papers was, however, able to analyze real GDP or to adopt a 
longer-run perspective including pre-1700 observations. 
3 Trend Growth Rates: an Initial Overview 
 
The underlying model for obtaining trend growth rates is that of an additive decomposition of 
the series tx , the logarithm of the variable under consideration and which is observed over 
                                                          
4
 Greasley et al. (2013) impose a two-break model and consider the whole period from 1270 to 2011 based on 
augmenting the estimates of Broadberry et al. (2015) with modern data.  They do not report the estimated trend 
growth rates for their three segments.  This superficial analysis was not the main focus of their paper. 
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the years Tt ,,2,1  , into a trend, t , and a cycle, t , typically assumed to be independent 
of each other, i.e.,  
 
 tttx       0stE   for all t and s     (1) 
 
Various models may be assumed for the trend component.  For example, t  may be defined 
as a deterministic segmented trend, typically linear in t but Mills and Crafts (1996a) have 
used a cubic polynomial; it may be defined as a stochastic ‘structural’ trend in which t  
follows a random walk with, perhaps, a random walk drift (see Crafts, Leybourne and Mills, 
1989, and Mills and Crafts, 1996b); or t  may be estimated using a filter, as in Crafts and 
Mills (2004).  Mills (2009, 2016) provides detailed historical and technical development of 
these various approaches. 
We employ in this section the last approach, and consequently fit Hodrick-Prescott (H-P, 
1997) trends to GDP, GDP per person, industrial production and industrial production per 
person.  H-P trends are chosen for a preliminary analysis because they are known to be robust 
to the shifting regimes that must naturally occur over a very long sample period of over 600 
years, and are readily comparable across the alternative series.  This comparison is facilitated 
by using the same smoothing parameter, set at 10000 , for each series, a setting that 
produces satisfactorily smooth, albeit evolving, trend components and readily interpretable 
trend growth rates, defined as t100 , which gives the growth rate in percentages per annum.  
The use of a higher value for   than is often employed in much macroeconomic modelling 
(for example, setting the smoothing parameter to 100 is common practice when using annual 
data) may be justified from the theoretical and simulation analyses of Harvey and Trimbur 
(2008) and Flaig (2015). 
The data that we use for this analysis are taken from the estimates reported as continuous 
series in index number format for 1270 to 1870 by Broadberry et al. (2015, Appendix 5.3).  
These estimates are for England only prior to 1700 and then for Great Britain.  We have 
extended these series to 1913 using the well-known estimates for the United Kingdom by 
Feinstein (1972, pp. T18, T111 and T120). 
The logarithms of the four series with H-P trends superimposed are shown in Figures 1 and 2, 
with trend growth rates shown in Figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3 shows that estimated trend 
growth of real GDP per person fluctuated around zero before the late 17
th
 century, increases 
to a low positive rate prior to the industrial revolution and then rises to a new peak of about 
1.25 per cent per year before falling back in the later 19
th
 century.  Trend growth averaged 
0.2 per cent per year from 1270 to 1770 which matches the claim made by Broadberry et al. 
(2015).  Trend growth in industrial production per person, displayed in Figure 4, is more 
volatile and, on average, higher, but follows a similar pattern over time. 
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In Figure 3, it is apparent that trend growth in real GDP shows a larger increase during the 
industrial revolution to reach a maximum of 2.41 per cent per year in 1851 (1.93% in 1853 
for real GDP per person), and a notable feature of the 19
th
-century experience is the inverted 
U-shape in estimated trend growth.  There are clear similarities with trend growth in 
industrial production, which is graphed in Figure 4.  Here too there is an inverted U-shape in 
the 19
th
 century with a peak at 3.22 per cent per year in 1834 (1.91% in 1838 for industrial 
production per person). 
We also show one-standard error lower bounds for the trend growth rates in Figures 3 and 4, 
computed using the method outlined in Giles (2011).  The lower bounds may be interpreted 
as providing approximately 16% level significance tests: one-standard error bounds are used 
here because of the extreme variability of the actual annual growth rates compared to trend 
growth rates, with the variance of actual growth rates being between 35 and 250 times the 
variance of trend growth rates.  This leads to standard errors in the region of 0.8% apart from 
at the two ends of the sample period, where the standard errors increase rapidly because of 
end-point effects (Figures 3 and 4 are consequently truncated to the years 1300 to 1900).  
Unfortunately, this means that discussion of comparative growth performance over time 
using this technique is somewhat compromised since differences in trend growth are never 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Periods in which the one-standard error lower bound of trend growth exceeds zero are shown 
as shaded intervals in Figures 3 and 4: for example, GDP per person trend growth is 
‘significantly’ above zero on this criterion between 1347 and 1352, between 1662 and 1688, 
and from 1830 onwards.  Even so, this implies that if a lower bound estimate is computed on 
a 2-standard error basis this will always be below zero, even after the industrial revolution.  
This seems to suggest that a forecaster could not rule out a ‘growth reversal’ even in the era 
of ‘modern economic growth’.  We believe that this would be an inappropriate conclusion to 
draw, as subsequent sections of the paper suggest. 
4  Segmented linear trend models of GDP per person and industrial 
production per person 
An alternative approach to estimating trend growth rates is to fit a segmented trend model 
which entails periodic breaks in trend.  We report estimates which suggest that this procedure 
has some statistical justification, at least when compared with the alternative of a difference 
stationary model, and generally provides support for the view that the growth process was 
trend stationary.  Viewing the long-run growth performance of the British economy through 
this lens allows a number of interesting inferences to be drawn, in particular because the 
standard errors associated with the estimated trends are much smaller, since the trend path is 
assumed to be deterministic, than those resulting from the Hodrick-Prescott methodology. 
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The results of this complementary approach to constructing trend growth rates for GDP per 
person are shown in Figure 5, where a segmented linear trend is fitted with breaks for the 
arrival and departure of the Black Death, at 1348 and 1352, and further breaks at 1663, 1707 
and 1822.  Although there is a developing literature on automatically selecting multiple break 
dates using computational algorithms and structural break tests (see Perron, 2006, for a 
comprehensive survey), they nevertheless remain in a relatively early stage of development 
and their properties in dynamic regression models have not been completely established, an 
important proviso here given that autocorrelation is found to be an integral feature of the 
segmented trend models reported below.
5
  Consequently, the break dates listed above have 
been chosen visually (i.e., exogenously), taking the description of growth outcomes given by 
Broadberry et al. (2015, p. 155-6, 158, 198, 211-2, 213) as a starting point.
6
  However, 
alternative break points in the vicinity of those chosen were also investigated to assess the 
robustness of this selection, which was found to be best in terms of overall goodness of fit.  
We would, in any case, emphasise that such models should be regarded primarily as 
descriptive devices rather than as formal structural models of the growth process. 
 
Nevertheless, the changes in trend growth in the late 17
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries can be 
linked to changes in the real economy, as has long been recognised in the historiography.  
The former probably represents an acceleration of Smithian growth associated with ‘the 
commercial revolution’ (Davis, 1967) reflected in expanding international trade and closely 
linked with urbanization, including the advance of London to become Europe’s largest city 
by 1700 (Wrigley, 1987).  The latter is the outcome of the technological changes of the 
industrial revolution whose impact on per capita growth only came through strongly by the 
second quarter of the 19
th
 century (Crafts and Harley, 1992). 
 
The general linear segmented model with m break dates can be written 
 
 


m
i
ttTTt uDtx ii
1
,         (2) 
 
where  
                                                          
5
 Clearly, standard structural break tests of the Chow variety are not appropriate here as multiple breaks are 
being considered within which there is both autocorrelation and heterogeneity of variance. 
6
 These are as follows. First, there is a description of negative growth of industrial production from the Black 
Death to the closing decades of the 15
th
 century (pp. 155-6). Second, a phase of sustained growth of industrial 
production before a marked acceleration after 1780 is identified (pp. 158-9). Third, there is a description of 
similar trends in real GDP growth (p. 198). Fourth, there is statement that positive trend growth in real GDP per 
person began between the end of the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution and then moderated in the early 18
th
 
century before accelerating to over 1 per cent per year by the 1830s (pp. 211-2). Fifth, it is noted that a big 
increase in the level of real GDP per head resulted from the Black Death and that this was subsequently 
maintained until trend growth began in the late 17
th
 century (p.213). 
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
 

otherwise0
1270
,
ii
tT
TtTt
D
i
 
 
Thus trend growth in the i-th segment is given by 
iTT
  
1
, from the estimate of 
which a standard error may readily be calculated using the formula for a variance of a linear 
combination of random variables.  The form of (2) actually fitted here has 5m  with 
13481 T , 13522 T , … , 18225 T , and takes the form 
 
 
   
 
 
   
ttt
tttt
uDD
DDDtx







,1822,1707
,1663,1352,1348
00049.0
00757.0
00102.0
00570.0
00091.0
00816.0
010.0
103.0
00014.0
00026.0
020.0
765.0
 
            (3) 
 
   
tttt auuu   31
043.0
159.0
037.0
531.0   0546.0ˆ a   988.0
2 R  
 
The error process is a stationary third order autoregression and aˆ  denotes the residual 
standard error.  Estimation is carried out by autoregressive least squares with the error 
process estimated jointly with the deterministic part of the model.  Figures in parentheses are 
HAC standard errors, used to capture any remaining and unmodelled autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.  The restriction 013521348   has been imposed, which forces the pre- 
and post-Black Death trend growth rates to be the same at 0.026 (0.014)%.
7
  This restriction 
is statistically acceptable (the accompanying test statistic is   98.2632,1 F  with a marginal 
significance level of 0.08) and the unrestricted estimates are  008.0089.0ˆ1348   and 
 008.0091.0ˆ1352  , so that 002.0ˆˆ 13521348  .   
 
Further statistical support for this segmented trend model is presented in Table 1(a), which 
reports Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for the segments defined in the model (3).  For each 
segment a unit root is conclusively rejected in favour of a trend stationary process.  
Interestingly, the test statistic for the complete post-1663 period is just –1.11 with a marginal 
probability value of 0.92, demonstrating that ignoring the shifts at 1707 and 1822 leads to the 
erroneous conclusion that the process generating GDP per person is difference stationary so 
that all shocks are permanent: a segmented trend model asserts, on the contrary, that shocks 
are typically transitory except at a small number of break points, where the trend shifts 
permanently. 
 
The picture that emerges from this analysis provides a number of interesting results.  First, it 
is seen in Figure 5 that both before and after the Black Death trend growth was constant at 
                                                          
7
 The standard error accompanying the estimate is shown in parentheses. 
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0.03% per annum.  An implication is that the Black Death produced a permanent upward 
shift of 36% in the level of GDP per person.  This is mirrored in the estimates reported by 
Broadberry et al., (2015, Table 5.06), which show real GDP per person in 1700 prices to have 
been £6.07 in the early 14
th
 century compared with £8.26 in the 1550s, at which point the 
population of England was 3.12 million compared with 4.72 million in the 1300s.  Second, 
the break at 1663 increased trend growth to 0.84 (0.68-1.00); trend growth then decreased to 
0.27 (0.21-0.33) after 1707 before increasing once again to 1.03 (0.97-1.09) from 1823 
onwards.
8
  These estimates indicate that there was a significant increase in trend growth of 
real GDP per person in the 17
th
 century, which was partly sustained before and during the 
early industrial revolution period, before a further significant increase after 1823.  Third, 
trend growth of real GDP per person is significantly above zero after 1663 even though 
population growth tended to accelerate.  By 1700, according to Broadberry et al. (2015, Table 
5.06), real GDP per head in England (Great Britain) was £12.68 (12.24) and population was 
5.20 (6.20) million. 
 
A similar model was fitted to industrial production per person. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
tt
tttt
uD
DDDtx







,1822
,1663,1352,1348
00128.0
00990.0
00083.0
00480.0
0134.0
0634.0
00032.0
00151.0
071.0
280.1
 
            (4) 
 
   
tttt auuu   31
045.0
154.0
046.0
736.0   0574.0ˆ a   995.0
2 R  
 
Here the restriction 013521348   is satisfied with a marginal significance level of 0.29 
(   11.1633,1 F ), the unrestricted estimates being  013.0047.0ˆ1348   and 
 012.0050.0ˆ1352  , so that 003.0ˆˆ 13521348  . 
   
This restricts the pre- and post-Black Death trend growth rates to be 0.15% (0.09-0.21), so 
that the Black Death thus produced a permanent increase in the level of industrial production 
per person of 30% with no alteration in trend growth.  In contrast to the model (3) for GDP 
per person, no significant break is found at 1707, so that from 1664 to 1822, industrial 
production per person trend growth was 0.63% (0.51-0.75) and after 1822 trend growth more 
than doubled to 1.62% (1.44-1.80), as seen in Figure 6. 
 
Table 1(b) reports unit root tests for the segments defined by model (4).  All the segments 
apart from the pre-Black Death period conclusively reject a unit root, with this first segment 
                                                          
8
 Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. 
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rejecting at a marginal significance level of 0.08.  There is thus strong statistical support for 
the segmented trend model (4). 
 
5 Segmented trend models of GDP and industrial production 
Segmented trend models for actual GDP and industrial production were also fitted.  For GDP 
the fitted model was 
 
 
         
tttttt uDDDDx  ,1781,1476,1352,1348
0003.0
0144.0
0003.0
0075.0
008.0
077.0
008.0
079.0
024.0
719.3  
(5) 
 
   
tttt auuu   31
042.0
168.0
039.0
528.0   0545.0ˆ a   998.0
2 R  
 
This provides a rather different picture of trend growth than that of GDP per person: see 
Figure 7.  Trend growth is now zero pre-Black Death, which itself led to a permanent fall in 
GDP of 27%, followed by declining trend growth of 0.15% (0.11-0.19) per annum until 1476.  
From 1477 to 1781 trend growth returned to a positive value of 0.60% (0.56-0.64), and from 
1782 onwards the rate increased to 2.04% (2.00-2.08).  Unit root tests for the segments of this 
model are reported in Table 1(c).  All conclusively reject a unit root, even when the final 
segment is itself split at 1851.  
 
The model fitted to industrial production was 
 
 
       
tttttt uDDDDx 





,1781,1446,1352,1348
0006.0
0199.0
0010.0
0087.0
018.0
076.0
018.0
078.0
070.0
286.3  
(6) 
 
   
tttt auuu   31
043.0
154.0
154.0
718.0   0569.0ˆ a   999.0
2 R  
 
A similar pattern as for GDP emerges.  As can be seen from Figure 8, trend growth before the 
Black Death is zero, with trend industrial production then falling continuously until 1446, the 
trend growth rate being –0.20% (–0.13-–0.27).  From 1447 to 1781 trend growth returned to a 
positive value of 0.67% (0.65-0.69), and from 1782 onwards the rate increased to 2.66% 
(2.61-2.71).  Unit root tests for the segments of this model are reported in Table 1(d).  
Industrial production is found to be difference stationary before 1446, in contrast to GDP.  
The final segment was again broken at 1851 and, unlike GDP, industrial production was 
found to be difference stationary for the sub-period 1782 to 1851. 
 
The constant trend growth rates for GDP and industrial production estimated from the final 
segment from 1782 are clearly at odds with the ‘inverted U-shaped’ trend growth found for 
11 
 
this period using an H-P filter shown in Figures 3 and 4.  Consequently, cubic segmented 
trend models of the type considered by Mills and Crafts (1996a) for an earlier industrial 
production series were also fitted.  For GDP this model took the form 
 
 
       
     
tttt
tttt
uDDD
DDDx





 3
,1781
7
72
,1781.1781
,1472,1352,1348
1062.1
1035.5
00003.0
00012.0
0016.0
0076.0
0003.0
0078.0
007.0
075.0
007.0
077.0
023.0
718.3
 
(7) 
 
   
tttt auuu   31
038.0
140.0
041.0
496.0   0539.0ˆ a   999.0
2 R  
 
while for industrial production, it took the form 
 
 
       
     
tttt
tttt
uDDD
DDDtx











3
,1781
7
72
,1781,1781
,1446,1352,1348
1039.2
10943
00005.0
00017.0
0028.0
0124.0
0007.0
0094.0
011.0
093.0
011.0
100.0
0022.0
0042.0
144.0
070.3
 
(8) 
 
   
tttt auuu   31
044.0
145.0
043.0
703.0   0566.0ˆ a   999.0
2 R  
 
where 
 
 


 

otherwise0
178112701781
2
2
,1781
tt
D t  
 


 

otherwise0
178112701781
3
3
,1781
tt
D t  
 
These non-linear segmented trends provide better statistical fits than the linear forms (5) and 
(6), with both the additional variables required to model a cubic trend highly significant.  
Interestingly, a unit root test for industrial production with a cubic trend incorporated yields a 
test statistic of –5.90 for the period 1782-1913, considerably smaller, and hence more in 
favour of (cubic) trend stationarity, than those reported in Table 1(d) for this period.
9
   
 
Figures 9 and 10 show trend growth from models (7) and (8) respectively along with H-P 
trend growth and the similarities between the two in the post-1782 period can now be clearly 
seen.  For GDP, segmented trend growth reaches a maximum of 2.27% (1.93-2.61) in 1857 
compared with 2.41% (0.81-4.01) for maximum H-P trend growth in 1851, while for 
                                                          
9
 Cubic segmented trends were also fitted to the two per person series for the final segment beginning in 1822.  
In both cases there was no evidence of an improved fit, with the higher order terms being insignificant in each 
equation. 
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industrial production segmented trend growth reaches a maximum of 2.99% (2.43-3.55) in 
1842 compared with 3.22% (1.38-5.06) in 1834 for maximum H-P trend growth. 
 
The outcome of this exercise is that the industrial revolution stands out as a transitory period 
when trend growth in industrial output was very high compared with both before and after.  It 
seems to us that this is the distinctive feature of the early 19
th
 century rather than the notion 
that industrial production was a difference-stationary process uniquely in the period from 
1782 to 1851. 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
Our results have implications not only for the quantification of claims made by Broadberry et 
al. (2015) but also for the wider historiography reviewed in section 2.  From the perspective 
of a segmented trend stationary view of the world and on the basis of the output estimates 
made by Broadberry et al. (2015), we have found the following. 
 
First, from the Black Death through the English Civil War, trend growth of real GDP per 
person was approximately zero, but from then until the industrial revolution trend growth was 
positive at a modest rate; the industrial revolution itself saw a significant further increase 
after the Napoleonic Wars to a rate consistent with modern economic growth.  This two-stage 
acceleration matches the predictions of a unified growth model as in Galor (2011) and the 
account of Broadberry et al. (2015), but the timing of the breaks in trend is quite different 
from that suggested by Greasley et al. (2013). 
 
Second, these estimates imply that the English economy was surprisingly resilient between 
the Black Death and the industrial revolution.  The Black Death itself emerges as a big 
positive levels shock to real GDP per person which moved the pre-industrial economy to a 
‘high-level equilibrium’ in the sense of Voigtländer and Voth (2013).  From the second half 
of the 17
th
 century we not only see positive trend growth in real GDP per person but this is 
based on a trend stationary process which implies that following a shock the economy would 
revert to its trend path.  This configuration underpins the emphasis placed by Broadberry et al. 
(2015) on the absence of ‘growth reversals’ and reinforces their interpretation of the Great 
Divergence. 
 
Third, we can clarify the nature of the ‘industrial revolution’.  It entailed an economically and 
statistically significant increase in trend growth of real GDP per person and industrial output 
per person but this was accompanied by an even more impressive increase in trend growth of 
industrial output.  We do not, however, agree with the suggestion made by Greasley and 
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Oxley (1994) that the industrial revolution should be characterized as a distinct 
macroeconomic epoch during which the growth of output was a difference stationary process.  
Trend growth in both GDP and industrial production exhibits an inverted-U shape during the 
19
th
 century which appears to be best described as a cubic segmented trend.  This finding is 
of great interest since it relates to the British experience of the first industrial revolution.  
Since this was the beginning of ‘modern economic growth’ it is important to understand what 
it entailed as clearly as possible.  This point is given added weight by the advent of unified 
growth theory for which the escape from the Malthusian era is a focal point. 
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 Test Statistic [prob value] 
1270–1348 –5.25 [0.00] 
1353–1663 –8.42 [0.00] 
1664–1707 –5.64 [0.00] 
1708–1822 –5.99 [0.00] 
1823–1913 –3.99 [0.01] 
 
(a) GDP per person 
 
 
 Test Statistic [prob value] 
1270–1348 –3.28 [0.08] 
1353–1663 –4.52 [0.00] 
1664–1822 –3.77 [0.02] 
1823–1913 –3.50 [0.04] 
 
(b) Industrial production per person 
 
 
 Test Statistic [prob value] 
1270–1348 –4.26 [0.01] 
1353–1476 –7.16 [0.00] 
1477–1775 –9.74 [0.02] 
1782-1851 –3.48 [0.05] 
1852-1913 –3.54 [0.04] 
1782–1913 –4.02 [0.01] 
 
(c) GDP 
 
 
 Test Statistic [prob value] 
1270–1348 –2.38 [0.39] 
1353–1476 –1.97 [0.61] 
1447–1781 –6.61 [0.00] 
1782-1851 –2.75 [0.22] 
1852-1913 –3.83 [0.02] 
1782–1913 –3.35 [0.06] 
 
(d) Industrial production 
 
 
Table 1 Dickey-Fuller test statistics for a unit root (constant and trend included; lag 
augmentation automatically selected using AIC) 
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Figure 1 GDP and GDP per person with H-P trend, 1270 – 1913. 
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Figure 2 Industrial production and industrial production per person with H-P trend, 
1270 – 1913. 
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Figure 3 GDP and GDP per person trend growth with one-standard error lower bounds 
(vertical scale decimalised percentages). 
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Figure 4 Industrial production and industrial production per person trend growth with 
one-standard error lower bounds (vertical scale decimalised percentages). 
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Figure 5 Segmented trend fitted to GDP per person. 
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Figure 6 Segmented trend fitted to industrial production per person. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Segmented trend fitted to GDP. 
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Figure 8 Segmented trend fitted to industrial production. 
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Figure 9 Cubic segmented and H-P trend growth rates for GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Cubic segmented and H-P trend growth rates for industrial production. 
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